On Behalf of the Fool: G.E. Moore and Our Knowledge of the Existence of Material Objects

Edward N. Martin

On Behalf of the Fool: G.E. Moore and Our Knowledge of the Existence of Material Objects

Edward N. Martin

Research output: Other contribution

Abstract

In this paper I argue that G.E. Moore’s naturalism (combined with his sense-data theory) falls prey to the charge, leveled recently by Plantinga, that Moore doesn’t know whether his belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly when he says he knows a pencil (or his hand) exists. Help from Alston may be sought in response to criticisms, but these are not sufficient to vindicate Moore’s form of naturalism.

Original language	Undefined/Unknown
State	Published - Jan 1 1996
Externally published	Yes

Publication series

Name	SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations

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Fulltext

http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/sor_fac_pubs/61

Cite this

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abstract = "In this paper I argue that G.E. Moore{\textquoteright}s naturalism (combined with his sense-data theory) falls prey to the charge, leveled recently by Plantinga, that Moore doesn{\textquoteright}t know whether his belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly when he says he knows a pencil (or his hand) exists. Help from Alston may be sought in response to criticisms, but these are not sufficient to vindicate Moore{\textquoteright}s form of naturalism.",

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AB - In this paper I argue that G.E. Moore’s naturalism (combined with his sense-data theory) falls prey to the charge, leveled recently by Plantinga, that Moore doesn’t know whether his belief-forming mechanisms are functioning properly when he says he knows a pencil (or his hand) exists. Help from Alston may be sought in response to criticisms, but these are not sufficient to vindicate Moore’s form of naturalism.

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T3 - SOR Faculty Publications and Presentations

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